U.S. Supreme Court Lessens the Burden for Employees Alleging a Discriminatory Job Transfer

Ashley Graves, Associate

On April 17, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,[1] and held that an employee alleging that his or her job transfer was discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 need only show that the transfer left them worse off in order to state a cognizable discrimination claim.  The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding that the alleged harm resulting from the transfer must be “significant,” reasoning that this sort of “heightened standard” is not contemplated by Title VII.

 Muldrow v. City of St. Louis - Background

Plaintiff Jatonya Muldrow (“Muldrow”) sued her employer—the St. Louis Police Department—alleging that she was transferred from one job to another because she is a woman.  For almost a decade, Muldrow worked as a plainclothes police officer in the Department’s Specialized Intelligence Division.  However, in 2017, the new commander requested—against Muldrow’s wishes—to transfer her to a different department so he could replace her with a male officer.  His request was granted and, while Muldrow’s rank and pay were unaffected, her responsibilities, certain benefits, and schedule changed.  After the transfer, Muldrow no longer collaborated with high-ranking officials in deciding the department’s priorities, lost access to her FBI status and an unmarked take-home vehicle, and had a less regular schedule where she was expected to work on weekends.  Muldrow's transfer also relegated her from prestigious assignments to primarily overseeing the daily routines of neighborhood patrol officers.

            The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department[2] and the Eighth Circuit affirmed[3], holding that Muldrow failed to show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage” for purposes of stating a cognizable sex discrimination claim under Title VII.  The Eighth Circuit determined that Muldrow did not meet this burden because the transfer “did not result in a diminution of her title, salary, or benefits” and caused “only minor changes in working conditions.”

 The Supreme Court’s Holding— “Significant” Harm Not Necessary

  Justice Kagan delivered the Court’s opinion (to which there was no dissent) rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s analysis, and holding that employees challenging job transfers under Title VII need only show that the transfer “brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.”  In other words, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the transfer left him or her worse off than before.  The Court found that Muldrow satisfied this test “with room to spare” because she was removed from a specialized division giving her substantial responsibility over priority investigations, lost her ability to work with police commanders, was less involved in high-visibility matters and was instead assigned primarily administrative work, suffered scheduling irregularities, and lost her FBI status and access to the take-home company vehicle. 

Employer Considerations

The Muldrow decision effectively dispels any notion that employees alleging discriminatory job transfers under Title VII must satisfy some heightened or “significant” harm threshold, and such claims are cognizable even when there is no change to an employee’s title, pay, or economic benefits.  Rather, as long as the transfer leaves the employee worse off than before (economically or otherwise), and the transfer is imposed because of a protected trait, then the employee has a viable Title VII claim.  Thus, employers cannot attempt to justify an otherwise-discriminatory job transfer on the grounds that the transfer did not cause any significant harm to the affected employee—although the nature and scope of any harm suffered will certainly be relevant to the employee’s actual damages.  Campbell Litigation remains available to assist employers with new legal developments in the labor and employment context as they arise.

[1]601 U.S. ---- (2024).

[2]No. 4:18-CV-02150-AGF, 2020 WL 5505113 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 11, 2020).

[3]30 F.4th 680 (8th Cir. 2022).